it. Since a thought occurs with reference to dharmas of the two timeepochs, they (i. e., past and future dharmas) must be recognized as existing.
Question (by H): You must first give the definition of existence. Answer (by the opponents): The definition of existence is to be an object (gocara) of knowledge (jnana). (TS 19, Discussing the same subject, V (asubandhu ca. 400-480) summarizes four arguments set forth by the Sarvastivadins in order to prove the sarvastivada. A (bhidharma) K(osa), ed. Swami D. Shastri, V: 25ab reads:
"(Dharmas) exist always (i. e., in all three time-epochs), for (i) it is said so (by the Buddha), (ii) (it is said by Him that consciousness (vijnana) arises) out of two (viz. sense-organ and an object), (iii) (consciousness)
takes an existing thing as its object, and (iv) (past karmas should have) a result. "(sarvakalastita, uktatvad dvayat sadvisayat phalat ; cf. A (bhidharma) D(ipa), ed, P. S. Jaini, K. 305-Read gocaratvac.)
Since the first answer given in Document I corresponds to the argument (iii)
of AK, the opponents of H must be Sarvastivadins of his period. This is further confirmed by the fact that the Def. of existence given in the second answer exactly corresponds to S(arhghabhadra ca. 430-490)'s celebrated Def.: as 'blue,' (2) a conjured object is seen as existent though it is nonexistent, (3) akincanyayatanasamapatti is so named because nothing is cognized (in it), (4) one sees a (nonexistent) double moon when one presses a finger on the eyes, (5) it is said in a sutra: "I know that I have no internal greed, "(6) it is said in a sutra: "...know that abandonment of greed towards color-form (rupa) is called 'abandonment of color-form'," and (7) 
cur with reference to a nonexistent object. For (1) consciousness arises, depending upon two dharmas, viz. a substratum (asraya) and an object {alambana). If consciousness arose without any object, it should arise without any substratum and the two dharmas would be unnecessary. Thus, there would be no Nirvana (because) consciousness would arise all the time.
(2) Moreover, consciousness is so named because it has an object of con- (TS 20, Now H insists that the past and future do not exist even in the conventional sense (TS 20, . His reasoning may be summarized as follows:
(1) If a dharma is in the present time-epoch, it has a function; past and future dharmas, however, have no function, and, consequently, they do not 1552, Vol. 28, pp. 961c-962a) , and it shows a close affinity with the sarvastivada of AK V. 25ab, of S and of AD. The affinity between V and H on this subject is so close that it may well be the case that the former used TS as a source-book for his AK. Anyhow, TS gives invaluable information on the cloctorinal development of the Sarvastivadins between the time of MV and V.
